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Abstract: The article compares the institutional constraints that limit the potential 
electoral impact of external voting in national legislative elections in the 28 Member 
States of the European Union (EU). It shows that the discrepancy between policy 
aims and outcomes can be mainly attributed to a variety of institutional constraints 
restricting the scope of the policy (through residence and professional qualifications); 
limiting eligible voters’ access to the ballot (through cumbersome registration 
procedures and voting methods); and reducing the electoral weight attributed to their 
votes (through distinct modes of representation). It argues that the discrepancy is at 
least partly the result of a combination of electoral and normative concerns about the 
influence that external voters could and should have in elections. Institutional 
restrictions on the franchise of external citizens may be interpreted as a way to keep 
the ‘Pandora’s Box’ of unexpected electoral consequences half-shut, by extending 
the suffrage to a traditionally excluded electorate while at the same time moderating 
the implications. 
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Introduction 
 
In 2006 Mexico joined the growing group of states that have extended the right to 
vote in national elections to their citizens abroad. With an estimated 12 million 
Mexican nationals residing in the United States alone, the introduction of external 
voting rights had significant potential to alter the electoral balance in a country that 
was about to experience one of the most highly disputed electoral competitions in its 
history. Yet in the presidential elections which took place a few months later, only 
32,000 voters cast a ballot from abroad – less than 1% of the estimated expatriate 
population of voting age. Accordingly, the electoral impact of the reform was 
negligible. This remarkably low turnout can be mainly attributed to an extremely 
cumbersome registration procedure, which was purposively introduced in order to 
mitigate the uncertain yet potentially determinant impact of external voting on 
electoral results.1 
 
This example is illustrative of a trend that can be observed on a global scale. On the 
one hand, the last three decades have seen a sharp increase in the number of states 
granting the right to vote in national elections to their citizens who reside temporarily 
or permanently abroad. Yet in the overwhelming majority of cases, the extension of 
the franchise has failed to alter expected electoral results significantly. In other 
words, there has been a noteworthy gap between the policy aims of extending the 
suffrage to all citizens irrespective of their place of residence, and the policy 
outcomes, characterised by low turnout and marginal electoral impact. 
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In this article we compare the institutional constraints that limit the potential electoral 
impact of external voting in national legislative elections in the 28 Member States of 
the European Union (EU). We do not focus on the question of whether external 
citizens, normatively, should be able to vote,2 or the reasons why states may 
enfranchise their external citizens.3 Rather, we focus on how this proceeds. We show 
that the discrepancy between policy aims and outcomes can be mainly attributed to a 
variety of institutional constraints restricting the scope of the policy (through 
residence and professional qualifications); limiting eligible voters’ access to the ballot 
(through cumbersome registration procedures and voting methods); and reducing the 
electoral weight attributed to their votes (through distinct modes of representation). 
 
While we do not seek to establish a clear causality and systematically test a 
hypothesis, we nonetheless argue, based on a combination of existing scholarship 
and detailed empirical investigation of current electoral laws, that the discrepancy is 
at least partly the result of a combination of electoral and normative concerns. 
Specifically, we identify an electoral argument that external citizens may have undue 
influence over the outcome of national elections either by diluting the votes of 
existing voters or tipping the result of an election, and a normative argument that 
external citizens should have a lesser claim to influence in homeland politics because 
they are less affected or have a lesser stake in the polity. From this perspective, 
institutional restrictions on the franchise of external citizens may be interpreted as a 
way to keep the ‘Pandora’s Box’ of unexpected electoral consequences half-shut, by 
extending the suffrage to a traditionally excluded electorate while at the same time 
moderating the implications. 
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The article is organised in two main parts. First, we discuss the normative and 
practical aspects of extending the franchise to expatriates. Second, we successively 
examine four aspects of the institutional set up in a comparative perspective across 
the 28 EU member states, using rich qualitative and quantitative data recently 
compiled by the European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship (EUDO-
Citizenship). 
 
Expansive Aims, Restrictive Outcomes: the Institutional Limits of External 
Voting 
 
The idea that citizens living outside a country’s borders should continue to enjoy 
voting rights in their country of citizenship has gained increasing traction in recent 
years. Most states until the 1960s either formally limited the right to vote to residents 
alone, or neglected to set up institutional pathways to enable their citizens to cast a 
ballot from abroad. Their inclusion in the demos was seen as an anomaly that could 
hardly be reconciled with the requirements of representative democracy.4 By the 
early 21st century, the reverse was true (a recent survey indicated that only 45 
states, out of 174 worldwide for which data are available, still completely 
disenfranchise their nationals living abroad),5 reflecting a wider shift in attitudes 
towards external citizens from benign neglect or outright hostility toward their gradual 
inclusion in the political community (see Lafleur in this volume).6  
 
In most instances, however, the electoral impact of the ‘expatriate vote’ has been 
insignificant. Only occasionally has the mobilisation of external voters changed the 
electoral balance to the benefit of political parties or candidates that had failed to 
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obtain a majority of domestic votes already. The 2006 general election in Italy 
provides one such exception. The scale of mobilisation and the clear partisan 
preference for left-wing parties among a newly-represented electorate of Italians 
abroad came as a surprise to most, and especially to Silvio Berlusconi’s right-wing 
coalition partners who had played an instrumental role in the introduction of external 
voting rights in 2001, under the assumption that they would be electorally rewarded 
for it.7 These seats were to prove crucial to the coalition. In a similar vein, the narrow 
re-election of Traian Basescu in the 2009 presidential elections in Romania has been 
widely attributed to the ballots cast by ‘Romanians abroad’ who, despite a relatively 
low turnout, voted en masse for the ruling party.8  
 
Yet these much-publicised cases are the exception rather than the rule. The most 
important reason for this may be that claims about an ‘age of migration’ are over-
stated, as the proportion of individuals living in a country other than the one in which 
they were born remains marginal as a percentage of the world population. For better 
or worse, most people still live sedentary lives and the membership boundaries of the 
demos and the territorial boundaries of the state remain by-and-large congruent.9 
However, in the growing number of countries that do enfranchise non-resident 
citizens, turnout among external voters has been consistently lower than among 
domestic ones. 
 
Such differential turnout may derive from the fact that political parties have neglected 
their external constituencies, while external voters have neglected domestic politics. 
On the one hand, the organisational challenges of campaigning abroad require 
considerable resources that political parties may lack or be unwilling to mobilise. On 
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the other, voters who left their country of citizenship long ago, or may never even 
have stepped foot in their putative ‘homeland’, may have limited interest in the 
politics of their country of origin. The interaction between an apathetic constituency 
and an indifferent political class goes far in explaining the low levels of political 
participation among an electorate that is generally less informed and more remotely 
affected by elections than their counterparts residing in the country. However, the 
expected costs and benefits for both parties and external voters are also determined 
by the institutional set up which regulates the potential electoral impact of non-
residents. Hence, rules matter, and a thorough comparative examination of their 
scope and implementation is required in order to understand the distinctive 
opportunities and constraints that shape the behaviour of both voters and parties. 
 
Before turning to the aspects of the institutional set up limiting the electoral impact of 
external voting, we briefly discuss two reasons why states may be encouraged to 
introduce such restrictions in the first place. 
 
The introduction of external voting rights raises a combination of electoral and 
normative concerns. Electorally, external citizens may be perceived to have undue 
influence over the outcome of national elections, either by diluting the votes of 
existing voters or tipping the result of an election. Existing scholarship has pointed to 
the fact that the anticipated electoral impact of introducing external voting rights 
shapes to a considerable extent the scope and implementation of the policy.10 Whilst 
desirable from a Rawlsian perspective, the veil of ignorance has long been lifted on 
the preferences and positions of citizens residing in liberal democracies, but the 
socio-demographic characteristics and, most importantly, ideological inclinations of 
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expatriates are largely unknown to political elites potentially competing for their votes. 
In political discourses, expatriate populations tend to be reified as ‘diasporas’, 
homogenous groups whose members share a clearly identifiable set of objective 
attributes and are collectively bounded by a common attachment to the homeland.11 
However, their dispersion across vast geographical areas and the broad range of 
reasons that led to their absence from the homeland suggests that external citizens 
may in fact be a highly diverse and fragmented constituency, whose electoral 
behaviour is both volatile and uncertain. 
 
Bauböck has drawn an insightful distinction between the fears of ‘swamping’ and 
‘tipping’.12 In the former, the pool of external voters is seen as disproportionately 
large compared to the domestic electorate and threatens to ‘swamp’ its influence. In 
the latter, the external vote may be expected to play a decisive role in determining 
the outcome of the election. This uncertainty is more pronounced before voting rights 
are introduced and tends to decline from one election to the next. If the tipping and 
swamping scenarios fail to materialise in the medium term (or prove greater than 
expected), we may expect modifications to the initial institutional constraints. While 
political parties may have contrary expectations – with some anticipating electoral 
rewards and others, liabilities – the necessity to reach a minimal consensus militates 
against the adoption of an ambitious reform, the consequences of which are 
unpredictable. 
 
Normatively, the argument focuses on whether external citizens should be 
represented on equal terms with resident citizens. It can be argued under different 
principles of enfranchisement that the degree of influence that should be given to 
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different groups can be differentiated according to the extent to which they are 
affected by, subjected by or stakeholders in the state’s laws. 13 External citizens may 
not be immediately influenced by most day-to-day laws of a state in which they do 
not live. Thus the representation given to them need not be equal with that of 
resident citizens.14 Such arguments have been invoked in various countries against 
the extension of the franchise to external citizens. In Britain, for instance, initial 
parliamentary opposition to the principle derived from the fact that government 
formation in the UK is a by-product of an electoral system that explicitly elects 
individual local representatives without any proportional seat allocation at national 
level, and that a person’s link to a specific locality diminishes rapidly once he or she 
leaves.15 
 
In the rest of this article we explore the ways in which various institutional 
frameworks interact with the enfranchisement of external voters to mitigate the 
potential impact of a population that is widely seen as having a lesser claim to 
influence over the polity than its fellow citizenry residing in the country. Our analysis 
complements earlier comparative studies which have found that that rights of 
enfranchisement beyond the realm of permanently resident national citizens vary 
widely by country, by electoral level and by category of exception.16 We place our 
focus on four factors and institutional constraints that contribute to determining the 
potential electoral impact of non-resident citizens on the electoral process: 
 
(1) Differences in the size of the external citizenry; 
(2) Restrictive rules of eligibility; 
(3) Restrictive rules of access to the ballot; 
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(4) Different modes of representation. 
 
Electoral concerns of ‘swamping’ and ‘tipping’ are addressed by all four modes of 
restriction. ‘Swamping’ is most likely to occur where external groupings are large, in 
which case restricting the number of eligible citizens can be achieved either by using 
nationality laws to restrict the extra-territorial perpetuation of citizenship, or by limiting 
the eligibility of external citizens to vote in the first place, through a combination of 
residence-based and professional qualifications. Moreover, even if all or most 
external citizens are enfranchised in principle, the extent to which they can 
participate in practice depends on how easy it is to register and to cast a ballot. 
 
Once the external electorate has voted, the extent to which it threatens to ‘swamp’ or 
‘tip’ the domestic electorate depends on how the non-resident voters are 
represented. Discrete or ‘special’ representation is often depicted as an enabling 
factor in guaranteeing that the distinct interests of the external community are 
represented in the life of the home state,17 though Bauböck has pointed out that non-
resident enfranchisement should be based on these citizens’ continued stake inside 
the polity.18 Discrete representation can also be used to mitigate the potential 
swamping effect by reducing the external electorate’s relative representation in 
relation to native citizens’. Such separate representation leads, however, to a greater 
danger of ‘tipping’, which is most likely to occur where the external electorate is 
cohesive and collectively mobilised. This can be addressed by each of the four types 
of restriction but most effectively by dispersing the votes of external citizens and 
assimilating them locally across the country, thus dissipating their effect and reducing 
their ability to act as a cohesive bloc. We do not postulate clear causal mechanisms 
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between these factors, nor do we suggest that these restrictions are always 
deliberate acts on the part of political elites with the explicit aim of alleviating fears of 
swamping or tipping. Moreover, we acknowledge that other factors may play a role 
and that the sample of 28 EU countries, whilst a substantial and coherent 
geographical set, may be not be large enough for individual national factors to be 
discounted from the equation. Nonetheless, we suggest that normative concerns may 
at least play a role in setting the agenda surrounding external enfranchisement, and 
that there is some degree of correlation between the openness with which states 
embrace their external citizens as part of the demos and the potential impact that that 
electorate may have. 
 
The Participation of External Citizens in Practice: A Comparative Overview of 
EU Member States 
 
To examine the qualitative differences between the electoral rights of external 
citizens we focus on four levels of restriction in one form of election – national 
parliamentary elections – across the 28 EU Member States. National parliamentary 
elections provide greatest comparability as they are held in every state, usually relate 
to the most powerful level of government within the country, and are fully under 
national jurisdiction. We utilise data recently compiled by the European Union 
Democracy Observatory on Citizenship (EUDO-Citizenship), in the form of electoral 
rights data drawn from a comprehensive database of current electoral laws across 
the 28 EU members.19 
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The Size of the External Electorate 
 
The dangers of ‘swamping’ are potentially greatest with large emigrant populations. 
In the literature on external voting rights, the presence of citizens residing abroad is 
often interpreted as the consequence of international migrations. Yet we should bear 
in mind that such a focus neglects the role that a state can play in regulating the size 
of its external citizenry through nationality laws. An exclusive focus on emigration 
patterns also emphasises migration of citizens across borders while neglecting the 
migration of borders across citizens (such as from the dissolution of established 
states and the creation of new ones) and stemming from the questionable premise 
that transnational communities constitute themselves almost naturally, irrespective of 
policies and discourses that are being pressed upon their members by political elites 
in their countries of residence and of citizenship. 
 
Instead, there may be several reasons for why external citizens of a country hold that 
status, including emigration, citizenship by descent (ius sanguinis) or acquisition of 
citizenship through cultural or ethnic affinity. Under certain circumstances that 
citizenship may be lost, such as naturalisation in another country which does not 
allow dual citizenship, or loss of ties to the home country. In examining the size of the 
external population of country, we must therefore bear in mind that this is a reflection 
not only of emigration but also of historical pathways and laws on the acquisition and 
loss of citizenship beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the state, insofar as they 
influence the universe of potential voters in the first place. 
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The resultant size of the external population can then in turn be expected to influence 
the propensity of policy-makers to enfranchise their external citizens, or to introduce 
certain restrictions to that enfranchisement. Specifically, the extent to which the 
electoral concerns of ‘swamping’ and ‘tipping’ and the normative concerns about the 
equality of their representation are prevalent can be expected to be related to the 
number of voters involved. 
 
The measurement of the external population is difficult. Ideally, we would take 
account of the number of citizens abroad based on a combination of migration, 
border changes and the rules on acquisition and loss of citizenship, the latter of 
which gives a policy instrument that states can use to regulate the perpetuation of its 
overseas population. Unfortunately, such a comprehensive source does not exist. As 
an approximation, we use a combination of UN Migration Stock data and Eurostat 
data.20 This has certain shortcomings – not least that it has exactly the over-
emphasis on migration rather than citizenship status discussed above, and 
potentially misses kin state minorities who have never lived in the country – but it 
gives at least a basic indication of how large each country’s external community 
potentially is relative to other states’, even if it largely neglects the instrumental 
element of discretion involved in citizenship regimes.21 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Figure 1 shows the proportionate sizes of the emigrant population as a share of the 
number of resident citizens. It is immediately apparent that the 28 EU states divide 
into one group with relatively large emigrant populations (over 13% of the overall 
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citizenry), and another in which the number of external citizens is relatively small 
(below 9%). Of the states with large external populations, it is notable that most have 
some sort of restriction around the enfranchisement of these citizens. Malta, Ireland 
and Cyprus use limitations of eligibility, while Croatia, Portugal and Romania 
separate out the representation of external voters into a number of discrete seats. 
Some of these states are also restrictive in terms of how easy it is to register or 
access the ballot, while in others – such as Bulgaria – the enfranchisement of 
external citizens has been controversial, as we shall see below. 
 
Therefore, there appears to be some correlation between emigrant communities that 
represent a significant proportion of the overall potential electorate and restrictions on 
the influence that that electorate has on domestic politics. 
 
Eligibility Criteria 
 
In most EU Member States, the possession of citizenship alone is a sufficient 
condition for the award of voting rights (assuming a potential voter registers to vote 
and is not disenfranchised by other universal restrictions such as age or criminal 
convictions).22 Only seven states have eligibility restrictions based on residence and 
professional qualifications. These are shown in figure 2, which sub-divides states 
according to the type of restrictions that apply, and the relative extent of these. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
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As we have noted already, most external citizens de facto cannot vote in Cyprus, 
Malta and Ireland (and in Denmark, which has a smaller emigrant population). This 
proceeds implicitly from a requirement of current residence. A limited group of 
citizens outside the country retain their voting rights on the basis that, although 
absent, they are still de jure living in the country: state servants (such as diplomats or 
soldiers) and, in Cyprus and Denmark, those who are deemed to be only temporarily 
absent (though, in Cypriot case, this is tempered by whether the voter can in fact 
access that vote).23 
 
Three further states require past residence, which limits the enfranchisement of 
people who have acquired citizenship by descent, or who left the country long ago. In 
Sweden, this residence must have been within the voter’s lifetime, while Germany 
requires three months’ residence within the previous 25 years, albeit (since 2013) 
with discretionary exceptions if a verifiable connection to German public life can be 
documented.24 The UK is less flexible: Britons abroad who wish to vote must have 
lived in the UK within the previous 15 years, and (unless they were too young at the 
time) have been included in the electoral register prior to their departure. The time 
limit has changed over the years, initially being set at five years in 1985, extended in 
1989 to 20, and then reduced (in 2000) to 15.25 These three states with past 
residence requirements have relatively small external populations (proportionally), 
but the restrictions ensure that only those who are ‘stakeholders’ based on recent 
interaction with the polity are able to continue voting. By contrast, three of the four 
states that have present residence requirements also have large external populations 
(Malta, Cyprus and Ireland). Ireland is often held up as an archetypical example of 
state with a large external population which could be subject to ‘swamping’ effects – 
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though in fact the number of actual citizens (as opposed to the much larger number 
of people of Irish descent) is arguably no higher than in many other countries.26 
 
Accessing the Ballot 
 
As we saw earlier, there are various means by which the unpredictable effects of 
external voting are attenuated. The central premise of this study is that an expatriate, 
even once enfranchised, often faces more obstacles to gaining representation than a 
native citizen. Two of the primary barriers to ballot access derive from registration 
and voting procedures. 
 
Registration. The ease with which a prospective voter can vote is affected by whether 
a state practises automatic registration (from other civil registration information) or 
active registration (in which the voter must apply separately and personally to the 
relevant authorities) – the latter of which obviously requires more effort. Figure 3 
classifies states by these criteria. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Whereas only four countries – Cyprus, France, Ireland and the UK – require active 
registration on the part of regular domestic voters, active registration is the EU norm 
for external voters. The bold country codes denote states in which the registration 
procedures are more onerous for non-residents than for residents. The large number 
of these indicates, once again, that states that enfranchise their external populations 
do not always do so on equal terms. Of the states that have active registration, 
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Belgium and Cyprus require it only the first time a voter registers, and Austria and 
Sweden require re-registration every ten years. In all other cases, the registration 
must be renewed frequently, and sometimes the task is accompanied by further 
bureaucratic hurdles – such as the UK’s initial requirement for a countersignature by 
another unrelated British citizen living abroad.27  Denmark and Italy make the 
process automatic only for state employees and later-generation immigrants 
respectively. 
 
Casting a vote. Being entitled and registered to vote are only part of the equation 
when it comes to accessing electoral rights. The relative ease with which a ballot can 
be cast also forms an important element in the equal treatment of non-resident 
voters. For domestic voters, voting generally involves a trip to a local polling station, 
with further options in many (though not all) cases for those who cannot vote in 
person. It is therefore important to look beyond the formal right to vote to the 
methods that voters can utilise to exercise that right, in order to assess how equally 
non-resident voters are able to use their ballot. 
 
[Table 1about here] 
 
Table 1 shows the combinations of ballot-casting that are possible in each country. 
Two methods – in-country voting and in-person voting at diplomatic premises – 
involve greater time and expense, either by returning to the country or potentially 
making a trip to the embassy or consulate. Postal, proxy and (as in Estonia and 
France) internet voting are more inclusive, but these methods have been rejected in 
some countries because of concerns about secrecy. 
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A group of nine states can be regarded as ‘restrictive’ in this regard, with varying 
degrees of constraint. The ballot is arguably least accessible in Greece and (for the 
small number of citizens enfranchised) Malta, which require voters to return to the 
country to vote.28 It is also the only guaranteed method in Cyprus where the option of 
voting on diplomatic premises is discretionary and dependent on at least 30 
applications in a district. 29  Two states allow voting only on diplomatic premises 
(Portugal and Croatia) 30  and five others (Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Finland and Romania) offer both these methods but no others. 
 
Evaluated overall, the process of registering for and accessing the ballot qualifies the 
right to vote in practice. Comparison of these nine ‘restrictive’ states once again 
indicates certain interesting connections between this group and other forms of 
restriction. Portugal, Croatia and Romania have special representation for their large 
external communities. Cyprus, as noted, has significant other qualifications of 
citizenship and voting rights abroad. Greece and Bulgaria are both unrestrictive of 
the right to vote in principle but in practice it is controversial. Greece, which has a 
relatively expansive citizenship regime and moderately high number of external 
citizens, has never legislated to put its constitutional guarantee of the right to a postal 
ballot into effect (despite a failed attempt in 2009).31 In Bulgaria, which has both a 
large emigrant population and an expansive external citizenship regime, particular 
controversy has centred on the suspicions of targeted electoral mobilisation of the 
Bulgarian-Turkish diaspora in Turkey, where a disproportionally large number of 
polling stations are set up and whose votes tend to fall overwhelmingly to the 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF).32 
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Representation 
 
Even if states enfranchise their external citizens and allow them to access their 
voting rights easily, the political salience of non-resident voters’ concerns can be 
affected by whether their votes are segregated or dispersed. Figure 4 shows how 
states represent their external voters in the electoral system. 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Discrete representation. We have highlighted the fact that policy-makers tend to be 
concerned by the uncertainty of how external voters may vote and, more particularly, 
by the dangers of ‘swamping’ when these groups are large. This is most likely to 
occur when there is a large non-resident population and the votes of individuals 
within that diaspora count equally alongside those of residents.33 Aside from 
straightforward disenfranchisement, one way that a state can still retain some degree 
of control over the potential effects is by separating out their representation into a 
discrete group of seats in the national parliament. This not only isolates that group’s 
representation, but also segments the political interests of the expatriate community. 
 
Additionally, the isolation of external representation from in-country representation 
enables variations in the number of voters per seat between the two groups. If 
‘swamping’ is a concern, non-resident citizens’ representation can be reduced 
relative to the native population’s if their representatives are clearly definable and 
accountable only to that electorate. As Table 2 shows, most of the states with 
external representatives follow the principle of territoriality and divide their non-
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residents into several geographically-defined voter districts.34 The exception is 
Croatia, which treats all non-resident voters worldwide as a single constituency. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
When we compare the number of registered voters per seat, France’s 11 single-
member district constituencies for the external electorate represent only a marginal 
under-representation relative to the domestic electorate – though as the external 
population is (relatively) small, this is perhaps unsurprising. The other cases, 
however, are more illuminating. Italy’s 3.5 million external voters collectively account 
for 7% of the electorate but have only 2% of the representation. A similar 
phenomenon is found in Portugal where the number of voters per external seat is 
more than double the average for the mainland seats. In Croatia, where external 
voters represent almost a tenth of the registered electorate, the three deputies for the 
diaspora represent on average 137,253 voters, compared with 27,251 per seat inside 
the country. However, this formal under-representation can to some extent be seen 
as compensation for lower registration and turnout rates among external voters. 
Indeed, as the final columns of Table 2 show, once turnout is taken into account, 
these differences are reduced or even reversed. 
 
This highlights that the relative strength of the representation is only one of several 
factors that attenuate the impact of external voters’ votes. Croatia is a good example 
of such electoral engineering. Approximately three-quarters of the external electorate 
lives in neighbouring Bosnia and Hercegovina, making the group more like kin 
citizens than a worldwide diaspora.35 The number of external seats has varied in 
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Croatia’s post-transition history and been politically controversial. In 1995, the 12 
seats set aside for external voters over-represented them once turnout was 
accounted for. From 2000 to 2007 the number of seats for the non-resident voters 
was variable and connected to turnout, effectively equalising the representation of all 
citizens inside and outside the country. The uncertainty engendered by this led to 
constitutional issues regarding the fact that the overall size of the parliament could 
potentially exceed its maximum prescribed size, so the number was fixed at three in 
2011. This formally leaves the external citizenry under-represented in the national 
parliament but the very low turnout more than cancels this out when the number of 
actual voters is taken into account.36 
 
To summarise, states that have discrete representation deal with the potential 
problem of ‘swamping’ by separating and reducing the relative share of the external 
electorate’s representation, letting differential turnout rates compensate for the formal 
under-representation of external voters. As Lafleur demonstrates in the Italian case, 
this may be a conscious decision and it can have unexpected consequences.37 
Discrete representation keeps external voters’ preferences to the fore and can 
contribute to the politicisation of their interests.38 This points to the other danger to 
the domestic political elite, namely that the few seats elected by external citizens 
could prove decisive in in a close election. This is a manifestation of the ‘tipping’ 
effect. One solution to this is the dispersal of the expatriate vote through assimilation 
at the sub-national level. 
 
Assimilation by biographical ties. Discrete representation is still the exception rather 
than the rule. All but five states assimilate the representation of external citizens into 
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the in-country voting totals, either at the aggregate national level, to a single pre-
defined district within the country, or (most commonly) into different electoral districts, 
usually based on biographical ties such as a voter’s last place of residence or 
ancestral home. 
 
Spiro has highlighted scenarios in which assimilated representation may be the most 
logical solution: where the electoral system distributes seats territorially (such as in 
the UK); where the external electorate is relatively small; or where the normative 
point of equality of representation is paramount.39 Moreover, although discrete 
representation solves the ‘swamping’ danger, a mobilised and consolidated external 
electorate may also have a ‘tipping’ effect when their votes are consolidated as a 
bloc. This can be mitigated if their voting power is dissipated across multiple 
constituencies and assimilated into local ballots. 
 
Among the 15 states with assimilated representation, Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, and 
Malta allow only a small number of external citizens to vote in the first place (as 
noted earlier), so the chances of political mobilisation of this group are low. Of the 
other 11, all but Estonia and Luxembourg have relatively low proportions of 
emigrants. In these two cases, there is a significant external population and a 
misalignment between citizenship and residence.40 Only 45% of the resident 
population had the right to vote in national elections in Luxembourg in 2009, while 
only 34% of the total citizen population were living or working on the country’s 
territory.41 In the Estonian case, turnout of the external electorate has also been very 
low.42 Thus, if the assimilation by biography is the main means of dispersing their 
collective political power, the low turnout figures also compound this. The extent to 
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which the turnout would be higher if the votes were more concentrated is, of course, 
worth considering. 
 
Although assimilation by district is held to be a means of dispersing the political 
influence of the external electorate, Belgium provides an interesting counter-
example. In this case expatriates can choose the municipality into which their votes 
will be assimilated, thereby steering controversies among Flemish political elites who 
fear that the vote of Francophone citizens abroad may be used in order to alter the 
electoral balance in the linguistically disputed municipalities in the periphery of 
Brussels.43 
 
Assimilated representation into a specific electoral district. Finally, there is a residual 
group of states that assimilates all their non-resident voters’ votes but do not divide 
them up into individual constituencies. Hungary and Bulgaria add the votes into the 
national totals (meaning that they influence only the higher-tier of nationally-allocated 
seats). In Bulgaria this was introduced precisely because of the ‘swamping’ risk 
through external votes, which were until 2001 dispersed to sparsely populated 
districts but began to play a disproportionate role in their regional representation.44 
 
The remaining six states – the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, 
Poland and Slovakia (plus Slovenia for voters whose biographical connection cannot 
be ascertained) – allocate external votes to a single voting district somewhere within 
the state. This is usually within the capital city, though in the Czech Republic the 
constituency is chosen by lot. A rare example of tipping occurred in the Czech 2006 
parliamentary election, in which the random allocat
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South Bohemia district led to an extra seat for the centre-right Civic Democrats due 
to the strong support for the party among the fewer than 7,000 external voters who 
participated. This took the overall left-right balance in the parliament to a deadlocked 
100-to-100 seats, and denied the left a majority.45 
 
Nonetheless, the dangers of this mode of assimilation may not be as large as they 
first appear. In Poland and the Netherlands, for example, the overall result is 
calculated across the country as a whole. It may even afford practical advantages: in 
Slovakia, all external voters are registered to a polling station in the Bratislava-
Petržalka district (close to Bratislava airport), which is also the station at which they 
must vote if they return to the country to cast a ballot in person. This keeps the 
administrative structure simple and guards against double-voting. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The generalisation of the external franchise is a recent phenomenon, which has had 
far reaching implications on the composition of the electorate and on the way in 
which competitive politics are fought out beyond the jurisdiction of the state. It is one 
aspect of an ongoing transformation of the relationship between territory, sovereignty 
and citizenship in a world characterised by protracted international migrations. This, 
however, has generated a variety of anxieties among political elites, concerned with 
the potentially determinant electoral impact of granting voting rights to a population 
whose partisan preferences are largely unknown and who are presumably less 
affected by the results of elections than their fellow citizens residing in the country 
where the election is held. 
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As a result, policy makers have sought to keep the Pandora’s Box ‘half-shut’, 
introducing external enfranchisement but using a variety of methods to ensure that 
the effects are mitigated. We have seen that, although external voting is a 
widespread phenomenon, its actual effect on election results is relatively limited, a 
phenomenon which can be partly attributed to multiple layers of de facto restrictions 
on the de jure right to vote. No EU state completely disenfranchises all its external 
citizens, but there is considerable variation on how many expatriates can vote based 
on the interaction of the vote with external population size, citizenship law, residence 
requirements, registration and voting procedures and modes of representation. 
Nevertheless, the rules and procedures regulating the external franchise are not set 
in stone, and recent developments suggest that restrictions are being gradually lifted 
in most EU Member States. Whether these changes will adequately deal with the 
electoral and normative concerns that accompany the phenomenon is a topic for 
future research. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 1: Emigrant populations as a percentage of all citizens 
 
 
 
Notes: 
Figures represent the percentage of emigrants as a proportion of all citizens. Country 
codes are ISO-3166-1-alpha 2 country codes, as modified by the European Union. 
See http://publications.europa.eu/code/en/en-370100.htm. 
 
Sources: Eurostat. Population by Citizenship; Eurostat, Europe in Figures; United 
Nations, Population Division. EUDO-Citizenship country reports: http://www.eudo-
citizenship.eu/electoral-rights/electoral-rights-reports. 
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Figure 2: Conditions of eligibility and residence, national legislative elections 
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Figure 3: Registration requirements for national legislative elections 
 
 
Note: States in bold have more stringent requirements for external citizens than for 
resident citizens. 
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Table 1: Ballot-casting options, national legislative elections 
 
  
In-country 
voting 
Personal 
voting 
abroad 
Proxy 
voting 
Postal 
voting 
E-voting  
AT YES NO NO YES NO 
BE YES YES YES YES NO 
BG YES YES NO NO NO 
CY YES YES (a) NO NO NO 
CZ YES YES NO NO NO 
DE YES NO NO YES NO 
DK YES YES NO YES NO 
EE YES YES NO YES YES 
EL YES NO NO NO NO 
ES NO YES NO YES NO 
FI YES YES NO NO NO 
FR YES YES YES YES YES 
HR NO YES NO NO NO 
HU NO YES NO YES NO 
IE NO NO NO YES NO 
IT YES NO NO YES NO 
LT NO YES NO YES NO 
LU NO NO NO YES NO 
LV YES YES NO YES NO 
MT YES NO NO NO NO 
NL YES YES YES YES (b) NO 
PL YES YES YES (c)  YES  NO 
PT NO YES NO NO NO 
RO YES YES NO NO NO 
SE YES YES NO  YES NO 
SI YES YES NO YES NO 
SK YES (d) NO NO YES NO 
UK YES NO YES YES NO 
 
Notes: 
 
(a) In Cyprus, the setting up of polling stations abroad is discretionary and 
depends on at least 30 applicants. 
(b) In the Netherlands, postal voting is only available to those abroad for work 
purposes.  
(c) In Poland, proxy voting is only available to those aged over 75 or disabled. 
(d) In Slovakia, all external voters who vote in-country must do so in a single 
polling station in Bratislava-Petržalka district. 
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Figure 4 Modes of representation 
 
Note:  
a 
= if biographical connections cannot be ascertained, votes are allocated to the 
electoral district that is the declared choice of the voter. 
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Table 2: Voters per seat in four states with discrete representation 
 
Country (Year) Constituency Registered Voters  No. of seats 
 Voters/ 
seat  
Turnout 
(%) 
 Actual 
voters/seat  
Italy (2013) Africa/Asia/Oceania/Antarctica                185,488  1          185,488  30.7%            56,853  
S. America            1,093,766 3          364,589  34.8%          126,845  
N-C. America                328,788  2          164,394  29.9%            49,109  
Europe            1,886,645 6          314,441  31.1%            97,781  
Italy external total            3,494,687  12          291,224  32.1%            93,525  
Italy (inland)          46,905,154  617            76,021  75.2%            57,166  
  
France (2012) 1 - North America                156,645  1          156,645  19.1%            29,869  
2 - Central/South America                  73,229  1            73,229  15.6%            11,390  
3 - North Europe                  88,405  1            88,405  20.6%            18,178  
4 - Benelux                  96,964  1            96,964  26.0%            25,242  
5 – Iberia                  79,530  1            79,530  20.8%            16,507  
6 - Switzerland/Liechtenstein                106,689  1          106,689  22.4%            23,872  
7 - Central Europe/Germany                  89,089  1            89,089  24.1%            21,449  
8 - Mediterranean                109,389  1          109,389  12.8%            13,965  
9 -N-W Africa                  97,068  1            97,068  18.3%            17,724  
10 - Rest of Africa/Arab                   91,324  1            91,324  23.0%            21,038  
11 - Asia & Australasia                  78,893  1            78,893  26.1%            20,569  
France External Total            1,067,225  11            97,020  20.6%            19,982  
France (inland)          42,166,423  566            74,499  56.3%            41,931  
  
Portugal (2011) Europe                  75,053  2            37,527  23.9%              8,970  
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Rest of World                120,056  2            60,028  12.6%              7,560  
Portugal External Total                195,109  4            97,555  16.9%              8,265  
Portugal (inland)            9,429,024  226            41,721  58.9%            24,582  
  
Croatia (2011) Croatia External total                 411,758  3          137,253  5.1%              7,038  
Croatia (inland)            3,842,363  141            27,251  61.9%            16,881  
 
Sources: French Ministry of Interior (2012); Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013); Portuguese Director General of Internal Affairs 
(2011); Croatian State Electoral Commission (2011). 
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